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1 Introduction
During the last decade there has been a resurgence of interest in decentralization around theworld.
Decentralization, or federalism, has been seen as the appropriate government structure to ensure
an efficient allocation of resources and to promote accountability.1 At the same time, there have
been extensive debates on how much authority to delegate to the European Union, which is a his-
torically unique example of centralizing certain policy areas in a federation of distinctly heteroge-
neous countries with often diverging interests.2 The implementation of decentralization policies,
however, has varied substantially across countries and, in many cases, it has been problematic or
not fully successful.3 The main reason has been that successful decentralization requires an ef-
fective allocation of responsibilities across levels of government, which, in turn, requires effective
communication of information that is distributed across different levels of policy decision-making.
That policy decision-making in federal economies is liable to asymmetric information (moral haz-
ard and adverse selection) has not gone unnoticed in the literature, but the emphasis has predom-
inantly been on the unverifiability of information regarding preferences for public goods and pro-
duction technologies. With the notable exception of Kessler (2014), the role of the federal and local
governments’ differential access to information and the importance of their effective communica-
tion have been neglected. This paper aims to fill this gap by focusing on the relative importance of
local and central government knowledge as a determinant of the optimal degree of decentralization
across countries when preferences across levels of government are misaligned.
More specifically, this paper identifies the transmission of information between government levels,
under misaligned interests between them, as an additional element that determines the optimal al-
location of policy decision-making and the degree of decentralization in a country. We show that
the degree of decentralization is not only determined by ‘communication’, but also by institutional
differences between unitary and federal states. These differences explain the different impact that
the importance of private information of government levels has on the decentralization choice.4
1The idea that fiscal federalism brings a better allocation of resources because local governments are better informed
than federal ones can be traced back to vonHayek (1945). Tiebout (1956), in the same spirit, also argued that competition
of jurisdictions for mobile consumers will bring about an efficient allocation of resources. See also Musgrave (1959)
and Oates (1972). Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that decentralization increases stability by reducing terrorism; see
Dreher and Fischer (2010) for an empirical test of this hypothesis.
2An issue of current policy concern in the EU, and one that is likely to dominate policy discussions in the years to come
iswhether the current EU system of financing is fit for purpose to deliver the EU’s objective as laid out in the Treaty. This,
naturally, brings both the composition of EU expenditure and own-tax financing to the fore in those discussions, themes
that raise the issue of expenditure allocation across the levels of governance in the EU and coordination between and
across levels of government. With the aggravation of the eurozone crisis, a European Fiscal Union has been advocated
for by scholars (e.g., Marzinotto et al. 2011) and policy makers (e.g., Trichet 2011).
3This was most notably the case in sub-Saharan African countries (Daflon and Madies 2013).
4It is worth emphasizing from the outset, however, that the focus is not on the precise nature of misaligned inter-
ests. These can arise through various channels, such as, for example, externalities, politics and lobbying (the intensity
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There are prominent examples that governments react to changes in the relative importance of
local and central knowledge by adjusting their level of decentralization. France, for instance, is
traditionally a highly centralized country whose constitution grants final control over the states’
structure to the central government. Still, as a consequence of the increasing complexity of French
society (Cole 2006, Crozier 1992, Caillose 2004), and the increasing importance of ‘local’ knowl-
edge (Montricher 1995), the government passed a series of reforms in the 1980s and 2000s that
aimed to increase decentralization.5 Despite this ongoing process of decentralization, however, lo-
cal decision-makers remain substantially constrained by the central government bureaucracy. The
center keeps hold of the ultimate decision-rights in many political areas which reflects the strong
unitary French tradition.
Germany, in contrast, emerged from a group of historically independent and distinct states, which
is reflected in its federal state structure thatmakes important political decisions subject to the agree-
ment of state or local governments. Recently, the rising importance of externalities and of central
coordination in some areas (e.g., environmental policy and trade policies) resulted in increased
centralization of some related policies (Koch and Krohn 2006).6 The state governments, however,
have used their legislative power in the federal state structure to resist a more extensive centraliza-
tion by retaining the right to deviate from national legislation in important areas (Chandna 2011,
Ipsen 2006). Thus, the importance of private information seems to affect the level of decentraliza-
tion, but we still observe surprisingly large differences between unitary and federal countries.
Our analysis uses a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, in which the
transmission of information (assumed to be costless) between local and federal governments is
‘soft’ and cannot be verified or is prohibitively costly to verify. Whenever the interests of the two
levels differ, however, the quality of the information will depend on such conflict of interests, with
each level of government rationally expecting the information transmitted by the other govern-
ment to be distorted (cheap talk game). Within this broad perspective, this paper focuses on the
comparison of two types of incentive structures, relative to the quality of the transmitted informa-
tion: ‘centralization’ and ‘decentralization.’ Under centralization the control rights over policies
are assigned to the federal government, whereas under decentralization it is the local governments
which own the control rights over policies.
Of particular interest is the possibility of delegation (either by the federal or the local governments)
of which may differ across the various levels of government). All that matters for the present analysis is that such
misalignment exists.
5Between 1990 and 2010 the sub-national share of government expenditures increased from 18% to 21%. Decentral-
ization was seen as an answer to the revival of ethno-territorial identities and cultural, linguistic, and territorial defense
movements that reflect an increasing bias in the interests of the central government and the individual departements or
regions (Chartier and Larvor 2004, Keating et al. 2003, de Winter and Türsan 1998).
6Germany’s sub-national expenditure share decreased from 46% in 1991 to 43% in 2010.
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in policies which can arise given local knowledge of policies. If the decision to decentralize is made
by the federal government, it might opt for delegating policies to the local government in order to
be able to better utilize local knowledge. But the local government could decide, too, to delegate
control to the federal government to benefit from the federal government’s superior information.
If the federal government opts for decentralization, the local government’s knowledge will be fully
utilized for the design of the policies, whereas the federal government’s own information will only
be partially exploited.
Under centralization, conversely, the federal government’s knowledge will be fully utilized and
any deviation from its preferences (due to the local government’s reporting bias) will be avoided.
The design of the chosen policies will then only partially make use of the local government’s
knowledge. Alternatively, if the decision to centralize (decentralize) is made by local authorities,
then, for given agency bias, the informational advantage of the federal (local) government must be
strictly greater than the advantage of the local (federal) government for the centralization (decen-
tralization) scheme to be optimal. Therefore, the optimal allocation of control rights over policies
will depend on the relative importance of the two parties’ information, as well as the size of the
agency bias, which simultaneously affects the amount of information transmitted and the degree
of (de)centralization chosen.
Agency bias, given by the extent to which interests across government levels are misaligned, can
therefore affect equilibrium outcomes. Intuition might suggest that more misaligned incentives
between the two levels of governmentwill lead tomore (less) centralizationwhen the federal (local)
government is the principal. This reasoning ignores that the agency bias also influences the quality
of communication. The reason for this is that an increase in the agency bias reduces the amount of
information transferred by the local governments to the federal government in the centralization
scheme and so the federal government’s incentive to decentralize may increase. But an increase in
the bias also reduces the quality of information transferred by the federal to the local government
under decentralization, thereby increasing the attractiveness of centralization. The extent to which
an increase in the misalignment of interests between the federal and local governments leads to
centralization or decentralization is, therefore, ambiguous and depends on the relative importance
of the information owned by the two levels of government.
An immediate empirical implication of the theoretical analysis is to investigate the degree of ‘deci-
sion power’ of the federal government to override local government decisions in relation to infor-
mation transmission problems. We demonstrate the importance of the model in a cross-sectional
panel analysis of sub-national expenditure decisions over the 1972-2010 period. The empirical
analysis confirms the theoretical prediction of the model that relative importance of the local and
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federal information, as well as the bias between national and sub-national governments, affects the
degree of decentralization. As predicted by the model, the results differ according to whether the
federal or the local governments have the right to decide on the share of subnational expenditures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the related literature, while Section
3 develops the model. Section 4 discusses the equilibrium in the centralization and in the decen-
tralization case when the federal government is the principal, while Section 5 analyzes the case in
which the local government is the principal. Section 6 describes themain variables of the empirical
analysis; Sections 7 and 8 show the empirical model and results. Finally, Section 9 summarizes and
concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper relates to several strands of literature. The first is the cheap-talk literature building on
the seminal work by Crawford and Sobel (1982). This strand of literature considers the conflict of
interests between the owner of a firm and its managers (see, for example, Dessein 2002) or between
its CEO and its division managers (as in Harris and Raviv 2005). More specifically, assuming one-
sided private information, Dessein (2002) examines the optimal allocation of authority inside an
organization with the aim of enhancing the use of (managers’) private information. He identifies a
trade-off between loss of control (under delegation/decentralization) and loss of information (un-
der centralization). His main result is that delegating control to the manager is optimal unless the
bias between the owner and the manager is so large that communication transmits hardly any pri-
vate information. Harris and Raviv (2005) provide a rationale for actual communication between
a CEO and the division managers in a two-sided private information framework.7 Though there
are similarities between the theory of the firm and that of fiscal federalism—namely the hierarchi-
cal organization structure and the structure of incentives—there are also distinct differences, most
notably in the different functions implemented by firms and governments.8
The second strand of literature emphasizes political incentives (as in, among others, Boadway et
al. 1996, Raff and Wilson 1997, Bucovetsky et al. 1998, Bordignon et al. 2001, Lockwood 2002, and
Kotsogiannis and Schwager 2008) within a decentralized system of governments. More recently,
Kessler (2014)—using the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982)—analyzes the public
spending decisions of a legislature when legislators engage in truthful information transmission.
Assuming that only local governments have an informational advantage, Kessler (2014) finds that
7For a theoretical and empirical application of two-sided incomplete information—using the IMF’s structural adjust-
ment programs—see Marchesi et al. (2011).
8For example, it is reasonable to think of the difference in the objectives (and so the agency bias) between the CEO
and the managers as being smaller than that between government levels.
5
misaligned interests between government levels make communication incomplete, leading to in-
efficiencies in federal spending decisions (either universalism or uniformity).9 Like Kessler (2014),
we analyze issues of communication in a decentralized economy, but unlike her we focus on com-
munication between a (representative) local and a federal government and the analysis of which
level should, optimally, have control over policies when private information is two-sided.
This contribution also relates to the literature on state formations (as in, for example, Alesina and
Spolaore 2003 and Spolaore 2013) as well as to the emerging literature on the structure of fiscal
unions.10 Like in this literature, we also consider the trade-off between the benefits from economies
of scale and the internalization of externalities versus the costs of combining heterogeneous popu-
lations and the partial use of local private information. We formalize this trade-off in an alternative
way, that sheds also light on the benefits of a fiscal union in the presence of misaligned interests
between participating countries.
Finally, the contribution of this paper is also empirical. Following Oates (1972), several contribu-
tions have analyzed the determinants of the degree of fiscal decentralization. Wallis and Oates
(1988), for instance, investigate the socio-economic determinants, whereas Panizza (1999) identi-
fies ethnic fractionalization (used as a proxy for heterogeneity in tastes) as a determinant of fiscal
decentralization. Panizza (1999) concludes that country size and income per capita are the two
factors that are most clearly, and positively correlated with fiscal decentralization. Treisman (2006)
identifies size, colonization, and economic development as the most robust correlates of fiscal de-
centralization. More recently, a large number of empirical contributions have emerged that investi-
gate the determinants of decentralization (Blume and Voigt 2011, Bahl and Wallace 2005, Bodman
et al. 2010), with some extending the scope of the literature by looking at decentralization in sub-
categories of government expenditures (Letelier 2005, Sacchi and Salotti 2012, 2013). None of these
contributions, however, identifies (in a cross-country context) the role of information as a possible
determinant of the degree of decentralization.
9Kessler (2014) revisits Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem in a world of incomplete information and strategic
communication in which policy uniformity is not assumed from the outset, but is a direct consequence of the inability
of local governments to credibly communicate information about local tastes to higher levels of government. Similarly
to Oates (1972), she identifies a trade-off between loss of coordination, under local authority, and loss of information,
under federal authority (increasing in the number of districts).
10Fiscal unions could be considered beneficial for many different reasons: creating greater equality or greater insur-
ance among unionmembers (Morelli et al. 2012 and Fahri andWerning 2012); helping to manage frictions in a culturally
dishomogeneous community (Guiso et al. 2013) or having a discipline effect by reducing the scope for localmoral hazard
by its single members. More generally, Alesina et al. (2005) have shown that the size of an international union depends
on a trade-off between the benefits of policy coordination and the cost of endogenous policymaking at the union level.
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3 Modeling communication between government levels
The framework relies on the model of Marchesi et al. (2011), which we modify in order to be appli-
cable to the issues central to this paper. The main change with respect to Marchesi et al. (as well as
toHarris andRaviv 2005), besides the different environment inwhichwe investigate the cheap talk,
is the distinction between two regimes according to who is the principal. While in Marchesi et al.
(2011), the multilateral organization is always the principal (deciding on whether or not to allow
the recipient of an IMF program freedom in designing reforms) in our framework, the constitu-
tionally granted rights determine the role of the principal and that of the agent. More specifically,
depending on the status quo, the principal could either be a federal government delegating more
decision-power to the local authority, or a local government delegating more decision-power to
the central one. This distinction across regimes will become crucial when we test our theoretical
predictions in Section 7.1.
The model features two players—federal and local governments—that possess different types of
information both required for the design of optimal policy as defined by
p∗ = l + f, (1)
where l and f are stochastic variables that proxy for information observed only by the local and,
respectively, the federal government. l and f are independently and uniformly distributed on the
intervals [0, L] and [0, F ], respectively, understood tomean that the larger the interval [0, L] ([0, F ]),
the larger the informational advantage of the local (federal) government.
To simplify the analytical setting, we focus here on the interaction between a central government
and one local government (taken as the ‘representative region’), which is assumed not to cover the
same population as the central government. Thus, we do not allow here for any interaction be-
tween different decentralized regions but simply focus on the average one. While this assumption
is strong, it allows us to focus on the issue of information transmission and on its implications for
the choice of centralization vs. decentralization. Due to the interdependency in communication
strategies, a model with multiple local regions will be muchmore difficult to analyze. Importantly,
it would not add relevant insights given that data to empirically distinguish the degree of decen-
tralization of different regions within a country do not exist.
The local government’s superior information over l could, for example, originate from its greater
proximity to the ‘local business environment’ relative to federal government officials or from bet-
ter knowledge about the need and demand, as well as the chances and risks, of local investment
projects.11
11This can also be viewed in the context of fiscal unions, for example in the European Union. The EU Commission
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The federal government’s informational advantage, relative to the local government, can originate
from several sources. First, country-wide knowledge is accumulated during its activities across the
local jurisdictions. Second, the federal government is also likely to possess informationwith higher
informational value about, at least partly, confidential issues such as military matters or activities
related to the negotiation and implementation of commercial treaties or multilateral activities. The
federal government is, therefore, better equipped to take country-wide economic conditions into
account when choosing an appropriate policy vector for the country. We assume both types of
information to be (at least partly) soft.
Events unfold in three stages: allocation of control rights by the principal, communication, and pol-
icy implementation.12 In the first stage, the principal (federal or local government) either allocates
authority over the choice of the policy vector to the agent or retains authority. Centralization refers
to the scheme in which the federal government decides on the policy vector, whereas under decen-
tralization control rights are allocated to the local governments. After the first stage of the game,
the real state of the world is revealed to both players. Then, in the second stage, communication
takes place. Under centralization, the local government sends a ‘message’ to the federal regarding
its ‘local knowledge’. Upon receiving the message, the federal government updates its beliefs and
chooses the policy vector. Under decentralization, the federal government sends a message to the
local government concerning its private knowledge of the state of the world. In this case, the local
government updates its beliefs and chooses the policy vector. Finally, in the third stage, the chosen
government level implements the policy vector and outcomes are realized.
The federal government is benevolent and assumed, for simplicity (and analytical tractability),
to minimize the square of the distance between the implemented policy vector p and the federal
government’s preferred policy vector p∗F given by
WF = wF − (p− p∗F )2. (2)
Similarly, the local government maximizes
WL = wL − (p− p∗L)2, (3)
which is monotonically decreasing in the distance between the actually implemented policy p, and
needs the member states to examine and evaluate the necessity and effectiveness of investment projects; on the other
hand, the interests of member states might deviate from those of the Commission. Local capture, for instance, is often
cited as a reason for the misuse and waste of EU Cohesion Fund resources in member countries by the European Court
of Auditors.
12The analytics feature the case inwhich both levels of government cannot commit to an incentive-compatible decision
rule in which the Revelation Principle applies. This assumption fits in well with the specific relationship between a
federal and a local government in which the principal cannot use a standard mechanism to elicit private information
from the agent.
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the local government’s preferred policy p∗L. The optimal policy choice of the local government
deviates from the economy-wide optimal policy p∗ (given by (1)) by a factor bL > 0 and is given by
p∗L = p
∗ − bL. (4)
bL proxies for all factors that might lead to a deviation of the local government’s preferences from
p∗: re-election concerns (electionmechanisms need not be the same as at the federal level), different
time-horizons, or the pressure of local interest groups.13
Similarly, the optimal policy of the federal government, p∗F , also differs from the economy-wide
optimal policy in the sense that
p∗F = p
∗ + bF , (5)
with bF > 0. A possible (but not the only) interpretation of bF is the existence of externalities
created by non-cooperative behavior on the part of the local governments. When choosing poli-
cies local governments do not internalize the impact of their policy actions on their neighboring
localities (for example, when deciding whether or not to provide tertiary education, regulation,
roads, or other public goods). This generates a misalignment of interest between the two levels of
government relative to the federal government’s country-wide objectives. This implies—following
from (4) and (5)—that the difference in optimal policies
p∗F − p∗L = p∗ + bF − ( p∗ − bL) = bF + bL = B. (6)
B reflects the extent of policy bias.
The next sections turn to the analysis of the communication game between the federal and local
governments under centralization and decentralization and under the two alternatives we are in-
terested in: Section 4 analyzes the case inwhich the status quo is a unitary country, where the federal
government has the final decision rights or veto powers on whether or not to delegate decision-
making power to the local governments (as, for example, in France, the United Kingdom, and
Sweden). In unitary states, decision-making power or autonomy over spending can be delegated
to local governments, but the federal government remains supreme, and possesses the power to
revoke these rights. Section 5 analyzes the case in which local governments possess the final deci-
sion rights or veto powers on whether or not to opt for more fiscal centralization (as, for example,
in the United States, Canada, and Switzerland). While spending and decision-rights might also
be centralized to some degree, federal states’ constitutions usually grant specific powers to the
13More generally, conflicts of interest over desired policy may reflect various causes and in principle the impact of
lobbies can be as strong at the federal as at the local level. In this paper, however, we assume a benevolent federal
government, in contrast with a local government that is assumed to be more responsive to private interests. Bordignon
et al. (2008), for example, find that when regional lobbies have conflicting interests, then lobbying is less damaging for
social welfare under centralization than under decentralization.
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sub-national governments, which the federal government cannot unilaterally take away and so
centralization beyond the degree outlined in the constitution needs the consent of the sub-national
governments.
4 Federal government as the principal
As principal, the federal government can choose between centralization or decentralization. In our
model centralization refers to the case in which the federal government has the final choice over
policies it wishes to implement in the third stage of the game, while it communicates with the
local governments in the second stage of the game. We will demonstrate shortly below that while,
by opting for centralization, the federal government minimizes the costs of misaligned incentives
as it makes full use of its private knowledge, it also increases the under-utilization of the local
government’s information.
Under decentralization the federal government allocates policy decision-making in the third stage
to the local government. To make their choices, the local governments try to extract private in-
formation from the federal government in the second stage. In this case, due to decentralization,
the local government’s private knowledge is fully exploited, but the results—as a consequence of
under-utilization of the information owned by the federal government and the misalignment in
interests—deviate from the optimal policy from the federal government’s perspective. The next
section analyzes these two schemes separately.
4.1 Communication under decentralization
For reasons of clarity we show all detailed derivations and proofs in the appendices, and focus on
the aspects of themodel that are central for the derivation of our hypotheses. In the communication
equilibrium, the local government only learns the interval to which the realization of f belongs,
and hence obtains only incomplete information about the federal government’s knowledge.14 The
smaller the size of the partition interval, the more informative the federal government’s message.
An informative equilibrium (always) exists in which the number of intervals N is maximal. We
denote the maximum number of intervals N(F,B), as a function of the bias B and the length of
the partition of the federal’s knowledge F . Accordingly, the federal government’s ex ante expected
welfare loss LFedDec(N,B, F ), is given by
LFedDec(N,B, F ) = B
2 + σ2f . (7)
14To be more precise, rather than thinking about direct manipulation of information (in the sense that organizations
‘manipulate the books’ in order to take advantage of information transmitted) one can also think of information that is
simply not ‘produced’. Think of a situation where the local government collects precise information regarding the local
preferences only when it is responsible for the policy design, but may decide not to do so when the decision over the
policy design is centralized.
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Hence, the uncertainty the local government faces before receiving the equilibrium signal by the
federal government is reflected in the ex-ante residual variance of the federal’s private information
f given by
σ2f ≡
F 2
12N2
+
B2
(
N2 − 1)
3
, (8)
which is decreasing inN , the expected degree of informativeness of the federal government’s mes-
sage.
The local government’s ex ante expected loss is then given by
LLocDec(N,B, F ) = σ
2
f , (9)
where σ2f is again derived from (8).15 Following Crawford and Sobel (1982), this communication
game has a focal equilibrium: that of the most informative equilibriumN(F,B). Given the bias B,
σ2f increases with F (the importance of the federal government’s private information) which also
implies that the federal government’s expected loss LLocDec increases with F .16 Since the federal gov-
ernment’s private information is not fully exploited under decentralization, the federal’s expected
loss is increasing in its informational advantage F .17 Finally, for any given F , the maximum preci-
sion of the information transmitted by the federal government decreases with the extent of the bias
B. Put differently, the extent and quality of information transmission depends on the proximity of
the preferences of the federal and the local governments: the larger the biasB, the less precise and
informative cheap talk will be.
4.2 Communication under centralization
If the federal government chooses centralization, it fully exploits its own information f and chooses
its preferred policy vector p, in the third stage, after receiving a signal from the local government
in the second stage. The local government is now the ‘sender’ and the federal government the
‘receiver.’ The federal government’s ex ante expected loss (for an equilibrium of size N ) under
centralization, LFedCen, is given by
LFedCen(N,B,L) = σ
2
l , (10)
with the ex ante residual variance of l being given by
σ2l ≡
L2
12N2
+
B2
(
N2 − 1)
3
, (11)
15Derivation of (7) and (9) are shown in Appendix B.
16There are, in general, multiple equilibria but, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), one can argue that agents would
reasonably coordinate on the one whose partition has the greatest number of elements. The reason is that before the
sender observes her private information, this is Pareto-superior to all other equilibria.
17The federal government’s informational advantage may depend not only on how relevant its knowledge is per se,
but also on how valuable such information is relative to the local government. For example, in highly intransparent
environments such informational advantages would be more salient compared to more transparent ones.
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where σ2l is decreasing in N , the expected degree of informativeness of the federal government’s
message. The local government’s ex ante expected loss, denoted by LLocCen, is given by18
LLocCen(N,B, F ) = B
2 + σ2l . (12)
Since both players’ ex ante expected loss increases with the residual variance σ2l , we focus on the
focal equilibrium, which corresponds to the maximum number of partitions. As centralization re-
sults in an underuse of the local government’s information, the local government’s ex ante expected
loss is increasing with its informational advantage L.19
Wenext turn towhether the federal government has an incentive to delegate the control of decision-
making to the local governments.
4.3 The choice between centralization and decentralization
As outlined above, the federal government determines whether or not to retain its control rights
over policies by comparing its ex ante expected loss under decentralization, LFedDec(N,B, F ), with its
expected loss under centralization, LFedCen(N,B,L). Since both are increasing in F (under decentral-
ization) andL (under centralization), we can identify cut-off values ofF andL at which the scheme
choice switches. The scheme choice, thus, depends on (B,F,L), that is, the extent of the conflict
of interest (B) and the relative importance of the two players’ respective informational advantage
(F,L).
Hence, the federal government will opt for decentralization only if the local government’s private
information L is (strictly) greater than its own private information F and greater than the thresh-
old level F (L,B). The threshold level F (L,B) is continuous and increasing in L, and, for any B,
F (L,B) < L. This holds because the loss due to underutilization of the local government’s infor-
mation is compensated for by the elimination of the bias and the full exploitation of the federal
government’s own private information L.
Conversely, the federal government always chooses centralizationwhenever its private information
F is more important than the agent’s private information (that is, F > L). Additionally, it opts for
centralization if F (L,B) ≤ F < L, that is, evenwhen its informational advantage F is smaller than
L, but greater than the threshold value F (L,B).
Figure 1 represents the choice between centralization and decentralization as a function of L and
F . The threshold F (L,B) is upward sloping, and divides the (L,F ) plane into two regions (cen-
tralization and decentralization) lying below the 45o line. In line with the previous discussion, the
18Derivation of (10) and (12) are both shown in Appendix B.
19The local government’s informational advantage, similarly to that of the federal’s above, may depend both on how
relevant its knowledge is per se, as well as on how important it is relative to the federal government.
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decentralization region is smaller than the centralization region: the agency biasB requiresL to be
strictly greater than F in order for decentralization to be optimal. Even when the federal govern-
ment has no private information and F equals zero the decision for decentralization still requires
L to be strictly greater than zero for all B > 0.
In general, the threshold F (L,B) is not monotone in the biasB, as an increase inB has both direct
and indirect effects. Directly, it increases the agency problem, thus reducing the federal govern-
ment’s incentive to delegate. Indirectly, an increase in B reduces the amount of information that
the federal government would reveal to the local government under decentralization, which also
makes centralization the more attractive choice. However, an increase in B also reduces the equi-
librium amount of information transferred by the local to the federal government under central-
ization, thus making decentralization more attractive. For some parameter values, the latter effect
can outweigh the first two.20 The empirical implications of this are discussed below.
Insert Figure 1 here
5 Local government as the principal
We now consider the case in which the local government is in the role of the principal and the
federal government is the agent. We assume that by taking advantage of its agenda-setting power,
the local government is able to take the lead in deciding the level of fiscal centralization. Like the
federal government in the case described above, the local government chooses between a decen-
tralization or centralization scheme. Thus, it decides whether or not to ‘delegate’ the choice of
the policy vector p to the federal government. Any divergence of the implemented policy from its
optimal policy p∗L results in a utility loss for the local government.
If it chooses centralization, the federal government will ask for the local government’s advice in the
second stage to decide which policies to implement in the third stage. The local government then
decides in the second stage howmuch of its private information it should communicate to the fed-
eral government. Centralization entirely exploits the federal government’s private knowledge, but
results in an under-utilization of the local government’s information and in sub-optimally chosen
policies from the local government’s point of view. The game under the decentralization scheme
unfolds in analogy.
20Since the derivative of F (L,B)with respect toB cannot be analytically derived, this result is obtained by numerical
simulations (see Harris and Raviv 2005 and 2008). In particular, as the boundary between the centralization and decen-
tralization regions is in general not monotone inB, for some parameter values, an increase in the agent’s bias can result
in more decentralization rather than less.
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5.1 Choice between decentralization and centralization
When does the local government have an incentive to assign its competence of the policy vector p
to the federal? In analogy to the previous analysis, the local government chooses whether or not to
retain its control rights over policies by comparing its ex ante expected loss under decentralization,
LLocDec(N,B, F ), with its expected loss under centralization, LLocCen(N,B,L). The choice will then,
once again, depend on the size of the conflict of interest (B) and on the relative importance of the
two players’ informational advantage (L,F ). In particular, the local government prefers central-
ization only if F ≥ L(F,B), where L(F,B) is continuous and increasing in F , and, for any level of
the bias B, L(F,B) > F .
Hence, for the local government to prefer centralization the federal government’s informational
advantage F must not only be (strictly) greater than its own private information L, but also greater
than a threshold level L(F,B). Conversely, the local government will opt for the decentralization
scheme whenever its private information is more important than that of the federal government,
that is L > F , and if L(F,B) ≤ L < F . Due to the misalignment of interests which causes the bias
B > 0, it can still be optimal for the local government to decentralize even when its informational
advantage is smaller than F ; the reason being that the loss caused by the underutilization of the
federal government’s information is compensated for by the elimination of the bias and the full
utilization of its own private information.
Figure 2 depicts the choice between centralization and decentralization as a function of L and F .
The boundary level L(F,B) is upward sloping, and divides the (L,F ) plane into two regions (cen-
tralization and decentralization) lying above the 45o line. In the setup with the local government
as the principal, the centralization region is now smaller than the decentralization region: the ex-
istence of the agency bias requires F to be strictly greater than L in order for centralization to be
optimal. Even when the local government has no private information and L equals zero, central-
ization with delegated control rights to the federal government requires F to be strictly greater
than zero for all B > 0. As above, the threshold level (F,B) is not monotone in B.
Insert Figure 2 here
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5.2 Empirical Implications
The model allows us to draw some normative indications regarding the allocation of control rights
over policy actions in the federal-local government relationship. The main prediction of the model
is that decentralization prevails when the importance of the local government’s private knowl-
edge either dominates the size of the bias or the importance of the federal government’s private
knowledge. To the contrary, centralization prevails when either the importance of the federal gov-
ernment’s knowledge or the size of the agency bias dominates the role of the region’s local knowl-
edge.
Several testable implications can be derived from the model. First, clearly, the importance of local
private knowledge should be related to more decentralization, and the importance of the central
government’s knowledge related to less decentralization. The key feature of the model, however,
is the presence of a non-monotonic relationship between decentralization and the misalignment
of interests between the government levels, which is caused by the differences between the prefer-
ences of the local and federal government. Specifically, this bias has both direct and indirect effects.
The direct effect of the bias reduces the incentives of the principal to delegate control rights to the
agent. Therefore, all else equal, the direct effect of the bias is negatively correlated with decentral-
ization if the federal government is the principal and positively correlated with decentralization if
the local government is the principal.
The indirect effect of the bias works in the opposite direction. Thus, an increase in the agent’s bias,
while making the agent’s choice less attractive to the principal, can also decrease the incentives
of the agent to communicate its private information in the centralization game more than in the
decentralization game. The net effect can result in switching from centralization to delegation,
when the bias increases, in order to make full use of the agent’s private information.21 Therefore,
the indirect effect should prevail if the information transferred by the agent is of high value to the
principal. The availability of information that is recorded can be limited, for example in developing
countries. This decreases the share of ‘hard’ information that can easily be transferred between
government levels, and increases the importance of private ‘soft’ knowledge. The relative share
of hard to soft information, in turn, may depend on the quality of the communication infrastruc-
ture. In fact, such quality may make, ceteris paribus, the existing informational asymmetry more
(or less) salient relative to the principal (whoever that is) leading to maintaining control rights over
policies.22 The following additional testable implications can thus be derived from the model:
21This–somewhat counterintuitive–result is due to the fact that the extent of communication is affected by the bias
differentially under the two regimes.
22We should emphasize that the quality of information transmission is not all related here to the actual cost of infor-
mation transmission (as signals are assumed to be costless) but simply to the relative importance of each side’s private
information.
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(1) In cases where the local government is the principal, the positive effect of the bias on decen-
tralization should be larger when the federal’s private information is less salient relative to the
local.
(2) In cases where the federal government is the principal, the negative effect of the bias on de-
centralization should be larger when the local’s private information is more salient relative to the
federal.
The next section empirically investigates the role that information plays in fiscal decentralization
using observations for a maximum of 66 countries over the 1972-2010 period. We begin with a
sample that contains all countries, but also explore the two cases where either the federal or the
local government is the principal. In these separate samples we interact the bias with the quality of
‘information transmission’ to disentangle the direct and the indirect effects of the bias. We expect
to find a positive interaction between bias and information transmission when the local govern-
ment is the principal, because better information transmission reduces the salience of the federal’s
information enhancing the effect of the bias on decentralization. We expect to find a negative (or
insignificant) interaction between the two when the federal government is the principal, because
better information transmission reduces the salience of local information, weakening the effect of
the bias on decentralization.
6 Data
The empirical analysis focuses on expenditure decentralization for two reasons: its direct link with
policy preferences and data availability. The overwhelmingmajority of the empirical studies in the
fiscal federalism literature have relied on fiscal expenditure and revenue data from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS). These data have some obvious
limitations. First, they are somewhat incomplete. Second, simply looking at fiscal decentralization
without taking account of the actual control local governments have over the collection and spend-
ingmight bemisleading. However, these data have the advantage of being available for a large and
therefore broadly representative sample of countries, and for a long period of time. We thus follow
the bulk of the literature in employing these measures, while being aware of their potential weak-
nesses. An alternative dataset exists for OECD countries, allowing to distinguish between those
expenditures and revenues over which the sub-federal units actually execute control (see Ebel and
Yilmaz 2003 and Rodden 2004 for a discussion). However, these data are limited to a small sample
of countries and years.
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6.1 Decentralization
We capture expenditure decentralization by the share of sub-federal expenditures in all govern-
ment expenditures. Themeasure is based on data submitted from countries following the Govern-
ment Finance StatisticsManual (GFSM) 2001 accounting guidelines, meant to ensure cross-country
comparability (Dziobek et al. 2011). The numerator of our measure is the total expenditure of
sub-federal government tiers, while the denominator is total spending by all levels of government
(referred to as general government by the IMF). In federal countries we use aggregated expendi-
tures for the state and local level to proxy for ‘local’ expenditures given that the data do not allow
further distinction. We use data for the 1972-2010 period and a maximum of 66 countries. In our
estimations, we use three-year averages to capture long-term trends and eliminate the influence of
short-term fluctuations. As mentioned above, even in the GFS dataset, which is the most compre-
hensive one available to researchers, many observations aremissing. Only three countries, Austria,
Denmark and Finland reported data to the IMF in every year. Out of the 66 countries, the average
as well as the median number of observations for the dependent variable is about 16 years only,
which translates in about six three-year periods. Among the countries in our sample, expenditure
decentralization ranges between 3.6 to 64.13 percent. On average, 27.97 percent of government
spending takes place at the sub-federal level (median: 27.62 percent).23 In the following, we pro-
pose a number of proxies to measure the extent of the agency bias and the relative informational
advantages of the federal and local governments.
6.2 Control variables
The choice of control variables is based on the literature that investigates the determinants of ex-
penditure decentralization. Economic control variables include (log) real per capitaGDP, (log) land
area (in square kilometers), (log) population, the share of the urban population in total population
and a binary variable indicating whether the country is a democracy. One would expect that most
of these variables have also a direct relationship to our hypotheses. With rising per capita GDP—
and so economic activity—the exchange of information becomes more important for the design of
optimal policy. Per capita GDP is included in most studies that try to explain decentralization (see,
for example, Sacchi and Salotti 2012). This variable is obtained from the Penn World Tables and is
measured in purchasing power parities (constant 2005 prices).
It is well documented that a country’s land size benefits decentralization.24 The larger the country,
the more diverse we would expect it to be, on average. More effort and logistical skills are required
23We fill missing data for countries of the European Union since 1990 using data from Eurostat, which follows the
same accounting guidelines. We tested for significant differences between the effects of data from the two sources by
inserting a binary indicator in our regressions, which turned out to be insignificant at conventional levels.
24We use a country’s (log) land size in square kilometers, taken from Treisman (2006).
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for the federal government to collect information in large areas. Distance from the center might
also lead to larger ideological distances from the median voter (Panizza 1999).
A country’s (log) population is a further proxy for its size that is frequently included in the related
literature. We use this variable and also include a country’s urban population relative to its total
population. Letelier (2005) argues that improvements in urban infrastructure induce centralization
by attracting parts of the rural population and thus a further concentration of public expenditure.
We take population andurbanization from theWorld Bank’sWorldDevelopment Indicators (2013).
The literature suggests a positive effect of democracy on decentralization (see, for example, Panizza
1999, andTreisman 2006), as dictatorships often promote rather large capital cities and, hence,more
centralized expenditures. On the other hand, autocratic leaders might have a tighter grasp on sub-
national decision-makers and thus decide to decentralize expenditures, while still controlling their
use. We, therefore, include a dummy variable indicating whether a country is democratic, taken
from Cheibub et al. (2010).25 Finally, we also include regional dummies and period fixed effects to
account for unobserved characteristics that might be correlated with our variables of interest.
6.3 Variables of interest
We focus on what we call ‘informational variables’. These (groups of) variables capture the impact
of the bias, and the importance of the country’s local and federal knowledge for optimal decision-
making. Part of the variables are available for much of the sample, while we have others for only a
smaller subgroup of countries and years. We, therefore, run separate regressions, one for the most
extensive sample, and one that contains all variables (but is restricted to a smaller sample). Table
1 presents an overview of all variables, assigned to one of the groups introduced above. Variables
printed in bold are available for thewhole sample, while variables in regular font are available only
for the smaller sample.
Bias: The conflict of interest between the federal and the local governments (agency bias) depends
on the degree of externalities. Centralized decision-making can have the advantage of taking ex-
ternalities into account. Our model shows that, ceteris paribus, larger externalities should lead to
less decentralization. As one proxy for externalities, we use the perceived risk of external conflict.
The larger the risk of conflict, the more important the potential externalities from centralized for-
eign policy on the regions. In the presence of local decision-making the deviation from the federal
government’s bliss point thus increases with external conflict. We take the International Country
Risk Guide’s (ICRG) external risk index to measure conflict. We transformed the original scale so
that higher values implymore external risk, on a scale of 1-12. We include trade openness, as trading
25In addition, as for example in Panizza (1999), we have also controlled for the initial level of decentralization, finding
results to be unchanged.
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with other countries involves negotiations about trade agreements or meetings and travel to other
countries to open new markets for national companies. Both local and state policies might thus
impose externalities on other regions and the center that are not taken account of. For example,
the federal governmentmight negotiate tariff-reductions in certain areas that benefit the country as
a whole, but might increase unemployment in certain regions. Local governments’ trade missions
might result in competition among regions, leading to trade diversion from other regions rather
than trade creation. Wemeasure openness to trade using the sum of imports and exports as a share
of GDP (from the Penn World Table 7.1). Oil production also imposes externalities. Large parts of
the proceeds usually accrue to the federal government (as oil is typically extracted and produced
by state companies and requires substantial fixed investments), while environmental damages are
born locally. Note that these variables measuring the bias can also be thought of as measuring the
importance of the federal government’s information, as we describe in more detail below.
We also include additional measures of heterogeneity. Our expectation is that greater diversity of
the population will, on average, imply larger differences in the policy preferences of the federal
government compared to that of the local governments. Our main index for the measurement of
heterogeneity is the ethnic fractionalization index taken from Alesina et al. (2003). It is widely used
in empirical studies, and is available for a large number of countries. More heterogeneity is a proxy
for a larger bias. As an alternative indicator we also consider an index of ethnic tensions, provided
by the ICRG (2013). The index captures perceptions among experts, with a range between 1-12.
We rescaled it so that higher values indicate larger tensions. We would expect the bias to increase
with higher perceived tensions between ethnicities, on average.26 As a further potential measure
of bias we include the migrant share of the total population, taken from the World Bank (2013), as
migration also increases the heterogeneity of a society, ceteris paribus.
Furthermore, we include government fractionalization, as it reflects the relative political weight of
the average governing party in national policy-making, which might also be an important factor
in decisions about career advancement for local politicians (Banks 2011). Low fractionalization
of government parties indicates that a government consists of a small number of strong parties,
that each have substantial impact on policy decisions. High fractionalization, on the other hand,
is indicative of a larger number of weak governing parties each of which has little influence over
policies. Since the ability to influence policy makes national political office attractive, higher gov-
ernment fractionalization, ceteris paribus, should result in lower career concerns for local politicians.
Their interest might consequently be less focused on central and overall country needs, which in-
creases the misalignment of interests across government levels.
26We also included Kolo’s (2012) DELF index, taking account of the degree of diversity between groups, but did not
obtain a significant result. Letelier (2005: 160) also discusses the potential importance of heterogeneity for the degree of
decentralization.
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Finally, we also use an index of government stability, taken from the ICRG (2013). Arguably, stability
of the political system is an important determinant of the politicians’ career concerns. One could
anticipate that local politicians take the expected lifetime of their party into account when making
decisions about how much effort to invest in career advancement within the party. The higher is
stability, themore attractive national office becomes, and themore local politicians take the center’s
and overall objectives of the country into account. Thus, higher stability should relate to a smaller
bias and to interests that are more aligned. The index ranges between 1-12, with higher values
indicating higher stability.
Knowledge: Knowledge variables capture the relative importance of each side’s private informa-
tion and can affect the degree of decentralization in both directions, depending onwho is in charge
of deciding about the degree of centralization in policy-making. In order to proxy this measure we
rely on two alternative proxies for information transmission and information transparency, in tandem
with a proxy for the availability of information (missing data). In additional specifications, we also
include press freedom and corruption.
The availability of information at the central level about the local level (and vice versa) is a crucial
factor in determining the delegation-decision of the respective principal. The higher the share
of hard relative to soft information, the lower the risk of not being fully informed by the agent.
We choose two alternative proxies for this variable of central importance in our model, each with
distinct advantages and disadvantages. Our first proxy is the quality of information transmission,
measuring how easily the local governments can get access to the federal government’s knowledge
and vice versa. With a higher quality of information transmission it is easier to verify information
and, therefore, to assess its relevance and importance for outcomes and decisions. Ideally, we
would like to capture the quality of information transmission across time and for a wide range of
countries. Our variable information transmission thus uses the number of telephone lines per 100
inhabitants (World Telecommunications/ICT Indicators Database 2011), which is widely available.
This variable is meant to proxy for all kind of technological barriers to information transmission.
The most relevant technology clearly varies over time, with the availability of internet access or
mobile phones arguably being a better proxy in more recent years, but hardly being available in
the earlier years of our sample. Note that the number of telephone lines is very highly correlated
with a combined ‘media access’ variable (0.80) and a variable capturing the number of computers
per capita (0.87) in those periods where both are available.27
Our alternative indicator is a measure for the general data transparency in a country. If trans-
27‘Media access’ combines access to TV, radio, papers, and internet (taken from Banks 2011). Higher values indicate
higher quality, and thus less importance of differences in ‘knowledge endowment’. Using the media access variable
yields positive and significant coefficients in our main sample as well, but in a much-reduced sample. Results are
available on request.
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parency is generally higher, more information is publicly available at both the central and local
level. It thus decreases the principal’s dependency on the respective other level, with more in-
formation being available in cases where no delegation is chosen. Information transparency is an
indicator of Informational Transparency and Accountability (Williams 2014), with lower values in-
dicating a lower ability to get access to reliable information about the other level for both the local
and the federal government.28
As additional measure of transparencywe also include the share of data series missing for a partic-
ular country and year in theWorld Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (2013), labeled
as Missing data (World Bank). We calculate the indicator as the share of non-missing data out of all
series for a given country and year.29 We also calculate the share of missing data for four main
indicators separately (the rate of inflation, budget balance, current account balance, domestic in-
vestment). On both indicators, higher values indicate more transparency. Following similar intu-
ition, we include two further proxies for the importance of differences between local and federal
knowledge in some of our regressions: We use an indicator measuring the degree of press freedom
(taken from Freedom House 2011, on a scale from 0-100), and an indicator of perceived corruption
(ICRG 2013). Higher values indicate more press freedom and more corruption (corruption being
rescaled from the original scale, ranging from 1-12). While these variables measure the importance
of information, they do not per se indicate an informational advantage for the federal or local gov-
ernment. We next turn to proxies for knowledge that give a distinct advantage to one level over
the other.
Importance of local knowledge: Local knowledge will become more important with greater com-
plexity. We proxy for complexity using ethnic tensions (‘heterogeneity’), ethnic fractionalization,
and migration, as discussed above in the context of bias. Ethnic fractionalization relates to the ex-
istence of language barriers and cultural differences that make local information more important
to the federal government. All three variables increase the dependence of the federal government
on local knowledge and should, therefore, lead to more decentralization.
Importance of federal knowledge: There are also variables that specifically relate to the impor-
tance of federal knowledge. First, there is educational quality. In many countries in our sample
highly skilled labor is scarce. Federal government jobs typically pay better and are better regarded
than local government jobs. Hence, if there is a shortage of highly qualified bureaucrats, they will
favor jobs with the federal government, on average. Accordingly, a lower overall level of educa-
tion reduces the capacity and quality of the local bureaucracy relative to the federal one. A higher
28The index is available for 190 countries, and is a composite indicator based on 29 sources. We use the combined
index of political and information transparency.
29This follows Hollyer et al. (2011), who suggest missing data on standard economic indicators (like inflation, among
others) as indicators for (a lack of) transparency.
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quality of education will accordingly reduce the local government’s dependence on the federal’s
knowledge and capacity and lead to more decentralization.
The importance of the federal government’s knowledge increases when external risk is more preva-
lent. Given that negotiations with foreign authorities is the prerogative of the federal govern-
ment, its knowledge gains in importance. A greater reliance on international trade, measured
by trade openness, also makes the federal government’s knowledge more important. Trading with
other countries involves negotiations about trade agreements. While both the federal and the lo-
cal governments might gather important private information from trade missions, negotiations on
more important issues—like preferential trade agreements or negotiations in the context of the
World Trade Organization—are the prerogative of the federal government, which should render
its knowledge more important compared to local knowledge. Oil production might be also of im-
portance in this context given that the federal government’s knowledge should be of greater im-
portance in oil-rich countries, for example due to tasks like working with other governments to
maintain a cartel (for example, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC), or
building pipelines and other large-scale national and international projects. In addition, oil compa-
nies in the bulk of oil-producing nations are at least partly state-ownedwith oil revenuemaking up
part of total government revenue. In such cases, federal government knowledge will be of greater
importance.
Table 1 contains the details of the definitions and sources of the variables included in the regres-
sions below. We provide descriptive statistics in Appendix D. As outlined above, some of the vari-
ables refer to both the influence of the agency problem and the importance of federal knowledge.
Since the impact of such indicators could be conflicting, in these cases the sign of the coefficient
will show the net effect, that is, the impact that dominates.
Appendix E shows the correlations of the variables included in the analysis. Note in particular that
the correlations between the variables measuring the bias and the informational variables are low.
Insert Table 1 here
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7 Methodology and basic results
We examine the determinants of expenditure decentralization using data for a maximum of 66
countries over the 1972-2010 period, depending on the control variables being included. Given the
lack of significant time variation in the decentralization variable we have averaged the data over
three years.30 We estimate (using OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level),
Di,t = α+ β1Zi,t−1 + ηi + τt + ui,t, (13)
where Di,t represents expenditure decentralization in country i at period t, and Z is a vector con-
taining the (lagged) variables discussed above. Finally, ηi and τt are region- and period-fixed ef-
fects, respectively, and ui,t is the error term.31
The results are presented in Table 2, focusing on our first proxy, information transmission. Column
1 reports the coefficients of the variables that are most commonly used in decentralization studies.
Column 2 shows thosemain variables of interest that are available for a reasonably large number of
countries and years (that is, those variables that do not reduce the number of observations below
200). Column 3 includes them both.
The results of column 1 show that decentralization increases with per capita GDP and land size, at
the one-percent level of significance. To the extent that larger and richer countries aremore diverse,
controlling for the other variables in the regression, this is in line with the model: greater diversity
increases decentralization. The size of population, urbanization, and the dummy for democracies
are not significant at conventional levels.
Column 2 turns to our variables of interest. As can be seen, decentralization increases with greater
heterogeneity (at the one-percent level of significance). This is in line with the model’s predictions.
First, greater heterogeneitymakes the local government’s information comparablymore important,
leading to decentralization. Second, it increases the agency bias. As specified above, a greater
bias has both a direct and an indirect effect, making the overall impact a priori ambiguous. The
direct effect is to increase the agency problem, thus reducing the local government’s incentive to
centralize (and vice versa). The indirect effect reduces the information transmission, namely the
amount of information transferred by the federal to the local government under decentralization,
leading to centralization (and vice versa). To the extent that the local government decides on the
30We replicated the analysis using averages of five years. While the number of observations is substantially lower, the
results (available upon request) continue to hold.
31We include regional dummies rather than country fixed effects because we would like to use the cross-sectional
variation of our variables for identification in addition to the within-country variation. Specifically, regional dummies
are taken from the Harvard Democracy Time-series Dataset, 2009, Data for 1971-2000.
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degree of centralized policy-making, we find that the direct effect dominates the indirect one.32
The results also show that decentralization increases with less openness to trade, better informa-
tion transmission, and better educational quality, all at the one-percent level of significance. The
negative effect of trade openness on decentralization is intuitive. In more open economies, the im-
portance of externalities increases—implying a larger bias—so that centralization is better-suited
compared to more closed economies. What is more, the knowledge of the federal government in-
creases in importance, giving rise to more centralization. The positive effect of educational quality
is in line with our hypothesis on the importance of federal knowledge: the larger availability of
well-educated people allows local governments to recruit ‘better’ officials, making decentraliza-
tion comparably beneficial. Oil rents and transparency are not significant at conventional levels.
Finally, better information transmission makes any difference in the knowledge between the local
and the federal government less crucial. To the extent that the local government is the principal it
would opt for greater decentralization for any given bias, which seems to dominate in our sample.
Column 3 includes the two sets of variables jointly. Per capita GDP is no longer significant at
conventional levels, and trade openness also loses its significance. Heterogeneity is significant at
the five-percent level and substantively important: an increase in heterogeneity by one standard
deviation increases the share of subnational expenditures by about five percent. With regard to
information transmission, the subnational share increases by over eight percent with an increase
of the quality by one standard deviation, which is in line with the model’s predictions when local
governments decide. An increase of one standard deviation in educational quality increases the
local share of expenditures by about five-percent. All of these effects are substantial in size and
their coefficients are significant at the five-percent level at least. They explain a significant share of
the variation of the dependent variable which gives support to the relevance of our model.
Column 4 adds the variables which are available for a reduced sample only. Note that changes
in the coefficients of the other variables might be due to changes in sample size rather than the
impact of the control variables. Overall, however, the results are similar. The exceptions are the
country’s land area and the quality of information transmission, which are no longer significant
at conventional levels. Trade openness becomes significant (again), at the ten-percent level, with a
negative coefficient.
Turning to the additional control variables, decentralization significantly increases with a larger
share of migrants in the population and lower risk of external conflict. The coefficients are signifi-
cant at the five- and one-percent level. A larger migrant share reflects greater heterogeneity, which
32While we aim to disentangle these effects further below, for now we note that the effects working in favor of more
decentralization dominate among the countries and years in our overall sample.
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in turnmakesmore decentralization optimal. An increase in the share of migrants by one standard
deviation implies an increase in decentralization by nearly seven percent. Larger risks increase the
importance of federal knowledge and thereby decrease the optimal level of decentralization, given
the larger role of externalities. It is also economically significant, as an increase of one standard
deviation would reduce the subnational expenditure share by over nineteen percent.
In summary, the evidence highlights the importance of local and federal knowledge, as well as the
importance of externalities in the design of a country’s degree of decentralization. Overall, the
results are more in line with the model’s predictions when the local governments decide on the
degree of centralization. In the next section, we disentangle countries in our sample where the
federal government is the principal and the local governments are the agents from those where
the local governments decide on the degree of decentralization and the federal government is the
agent. We also try to disentangle the two potential effects of the bias—the direct and the indirect
one—depending on the availability of information.
Column 5 of Table 2 turns to the two components of the bias. In order to disentangle the counter-
vailing effects of knowledge and bias, we interact information transmission with heterogeneity. Col-
umn 5 adds the interaction to our preferred specification (of column 3). Greater heterogeneity leads
to a higher optimal degree of decentralization, as local knowledge becomes more important. As
can be seen, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant at the one-percent
level. The effect of heterogeneity increases with better quality of information transmission, so that
the gap between federal and local knowledge is smaller. Thus, for any given bias, decentralization
becomes more likely with easier availability of information, as predicted by the model when the
status quo is decentralization.
Insert Figure 3 here
Turning to the second component of the interaction term, the bias, note that decentralization should
increase with a larger bias if the local government is the principal, and decrease otherwise. This
argument, however, overlooks the fact that an increase in the bias also has the (indirect) effect of
reducing the amount of communication, thus making decentralization more costly from the local
government’s perspective (and centralization more costly from the federal government’s perspec-
tive). The interaction effect allows us to differentiate between the direct and the indirect effects.
Specifically, with the local government being the principal, we expect to find that a greater bias in-
creases centralization only when information transmission is low.33 The results from column 5 in
Table 2 confirm such intuition; the coefficient of the interaction variable is positive and significant.
33On the other hand, when the federal government is the principal, we expect decentralization to prevail with a larger
bias only if information transmission is more difficult.
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Figure 3 shows the marginal effect. The result shows that the marginal effect of heterogeneity on
decentralization is positive and significant only for high levels of information transmission and not
significant when information transmission is low and would be more important. Therefore, these
results are consistent with the prediction of our model when the local government is the principal
in this overall sample.
Table 3 shows that our results are robust to using information transparency proxied with the Infor-
mational Transparency and Accountability Index as measure for the importance of private infor-
mation. Table 4 shows the results using a random effects model. As outlined above, we do not
estimate fixed effects models due to the lack of variation in our variables of interest over time.34 As
can be seen, the results are in line with those shown above. In particular, please note that they do
not depend on using telephone lines as a proxy for information transmission.
8 Who is the principal and who is the agent?
We now focus on the specific test of the distinction between two regimes depending on who is the
principal and who is the agent. To this end, we split the sample in two sub-groups according to
whether the federal or the local government is more likely to decide on the degree of decentral-
ization. It is arguably hard to decide which empirical proxy is most likely to capture our theo-
retical notion of a principal and an agent. To reduce subjectivity in the decision for a particular
variable, we use a broad range of indicators. First, we consider whether a country is federal or
unitary. Classifications are available fromNorris (2008) and Elazar (1995), the latter being updated
by Treisman (2008). Second, we distinguish countries where the constitution explicitly grants sub-
national governments residual power to legislate from those where all legislative power remains
with the central government (Treisman 2008). Beck et al. (2001) provide data indicating whether
sub-national governments have authority over taxing, spending, or legislating. In this case, they
can directly influence the degree of expenditure decentralization. What is more, we focus on coun-
tries where sub-national governments are locally elected (Treisman 2008). Direct election by voters
increases the legitimacy of subnational governments, so that it becomes more difficult for the fed-
eral government to resist and impede changes proposed by subnational governments, increasing
their discretionary power. Appendix F shows how individual countries are classified according to
all measures.
Table 5 shows the results, focusing on the interaction between bias and information. The table
employs both proxies for the importance of private information: information transmission and in-
formation transpareny, and the five different definitions of federal vs. unitary states. The fact that
34Additional tables with the full specifications of all models are available on request.
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the indicators stem from different authors and sources should minimize sensitivity towards the
choice of a certain specification. The theoretical effect of heterogeneity as a proxy for bias and
importance of information are ambiguous when we do not take institutional differences into ac-
count. However, for a given level of heterogeneity of the country, an improvement in information
transmission implies lower salience of federal information; leading to more decentralization when
the local government is the principal (’agenda-setter’). Facing the trade off between loss of control
and loss of information, the local government will be less willing to give up part of its authority
in exchange for an informational gain. This should be reflected in a positive interaction between
the information variable and heterogeneity. On the contrary, if the central government maintains
the final decision rights (federal level as ’agenda setter’), better access to information means less
reliance on local information. In this case we would expect a negative interaction effect.
The results are in line with the predictions of the model, and are surprisingly robust across the
five indicators. In all five specifications, the interaction between heterogeneity and our proxy for
information is positive and significant at least at the five-percent level in federal countries, while it
is negative or not significantly different from zero in unitary countries. This is reassuring: While
the number of observations that classify the local or federal government as the agenda-setter dif-
fers across the indicators, all of them seem to capture the institutional differences we modeled in a
similar way. One reason why the negative interaction terms in unitary states are mostly insignifi-
cant might be a lack of variation in decentralization rates in these subsamples, which leads to large
standard errors. More importantly, and as expected based on the model, the difference between
the coefficients of the interaction terms in the two models is significant in nine out of ten cases
(tested employing a seemingly unrelated regression model).
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the differential effects, using Elazar’s (1995) classification, which results in
the most equal share of federal and unitary states. Figure 4 depicts the marginal effect of better in-
formation transmission on the decentralization ratio for federal states. For low levels of information
transmission, higher heterogeneity does not lead to more decentralization. However, conditional
on a certain level of information transmission, higher heterogeneity makes local governments opt
for more decentralization. The intuition is simple: the higher the perceived misalignment of in-
terest, the fewer tasks local governments want to delegate to the central government. Hence, we
expect a positive relation between heterogeneity and decentralization. However, decentralization
is also limited by the need of local governments to receive information from the center. Thus,
we expect a positive effect of heterogeneity on decentralization only when it is easier for the local
government to independently access federal information.35 The opposite should hold when the
35High levels of information transmission imply a lower share of soft to hard information, which reduces the saliency
of the informational asymmetry between the principal and the agent.
27
central government is the agenda setter. As figure 5 shows, the picture for unitary states is again
in line with our theory. If information transmission is of poor quality, greater heterogeneity makes
the central government decentralize more, arguably to cope with the increased importance of local
information. When access to local information is easier, however, the central government—being
aware of the increased misalignment in interests—refrains from decentralizing.
It is clear that the lack of variation and the gaps in our dependent variable will make it difficult to
identify similar effects in a model including country fixed effects. Indeed, the noise-to-signal ratio
is so high that the coefficients of all variables in this model become insignificant at conventional
levels. Rather than including fixed effects we therefore address our main reason for whywewould
like to include them—the presence of unobserved omitted variables that are related to the decen-
tralization ratio—by controlling for the level of decentralization in the first period to alleviate such
concerns. If omitted factors only have an influence on the level and not on the change in decen-
tralization and are time-invariant, we should capture the potential bias by conditioning on initial
decentralization. Our results hold for all five different specifications when we include the initial
degree of decentralization, as shown in Table 6. The differences between the two regimes remain
significant, at the one-percent level throughout.
In line with the model, when the local government is the principal, better information transmis-
sion increases the effect of heterogeneity on decentralization. When the federal government is the
principal, lower differences in information decrease the importance of local information and thus
reduce the positive effect of heterogeneity on decentralization.
Insert Figure 4 here
Insert Figure 5 here
28
9 Conclusions
Our model has focused on the importance of information transmission between federal and local
governments in the design of policies. By explicitly relating the quality of the information supplied
by local governments to the federal government (and vice versa) to the misalignment of interests
between the two, the analysis has derived the properties of different decentralization schemes.
More specifically, the analysis has compared an institution in which control rights over policies
are allocated to the federal government (‘centralization’), with an institution in which local gov-
ernments are left with considerable freedom to devise their own policy actions, ultimately being
judged by outcomes (‘decentralization’). The results have shown that, for a given agency bias, and
when the local government decides about the degree of centralization, the informational advan-
tage of the federal government must strictly be greater than the informational advantage of the
local governments for the centralization scheme to be optimal. As far as the effect of the agency
bias is concerned, intuition suggests that an increase in the misalignment of interests between the
federal and the local governments would lead towards decentralization.
Since an increase in the bias also reduces the amount of information transferred by the federal
government to the local ones under the decentralization scheme, the local governments’ incentives
to centralize may increase. It is, therefore, the case that the impact of the agency bias alone on
the optimal choice of decentralization is a priori undetermined, and this holds in analogy when
the central government decides on the degree of decentralization. Interestingly, it is possible to
disentangle both schemes by focusing on the interaction between the agency bias and information
transmission. Depending on the quality of information transmission, an increase in the bias af-
fects the optimal degree of decentralization differently when the local or the federal government
is the principal. When control rights remain with the local units, and the quality of information
transmission is high (less of the information is soft and unverifiable), the effect of the agency bias
on decentralization should be higher. This is the case because local governments depend less on
central information, and thus react to a larger misalignment of interests by increasing decentraliza-
tion and providing more room for deviation from the policy preferred by the federal government.
When control rights remain with the federal government, on the other hand, higher quality of in-
formation transmission causes less reliance on local soft and unverifiable information. Thus, the
federal government will react to a larger misalignment of interests by increasing centralization.
Expenditure decentralization varies widely across countries and over time. In our sample, the
range is between 3.6 to 64.13 percent, with an average of 27.97 percent of government spending
taking place at the sub-federal level. Even controlling for factors identified in the literature as
determinants of decentralization, stark differences across countries remain. We suggest that the
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combination of agency problems and informational asymmetries between the federal and local
governments can explain such differences. We test the theoretical implications empirically by relat-
ing the degree of fiscal decentralization to information transmission and the size of the bias. Con-
trolling for country-characteristics, their economic performance, and for ‘political’ motivations, we
find empirical results consistent with the theory. In line with the existing literature, decentraliza-
tion increases with land size, while GDP per capita, the size of the population, urbanization, and
democracy do not robustly determine decentralization.
With respect to our variables of interest, we find that decentralization increases with less open-
ness to trade and better educational quality, as the relative importance of the federal government’s
knowledge diminishes. What is more, decentralization increases with better information transmis-
sion and greater heterogeneity. Overall, better information transmission leads to more decentral-
ization, which is consistent with the model when the status quo is decentralization.
Heterogeneity is at the same time a measure of the importance of the local knowledge and the
agency bias. Greater importance of the local government’s knowledge does lead to more decen-
tralization, consistent with the theory. The impact of the bias is, however, less straightforward, as
it is influenced by who has control rights, that is, who has the final say in deciding on the degree of
decentralization. In our overall sample, we find that the effect of heterogeneity on decentralization
increases with better quality of information transmission. This positive interaction effect is in line
with the case where control rights on the degree of decentralization lie with local governments.
To justify the theoretical emphasis on the importance of control rights, we distinguished between
the cases of federal and local control. We used five distinct constitutional and statutory country
characteristics in order to separate those countries where the federal government is more likely to
be the principal and the local governments the agents, from those where the local governments
have more political power to decide on the degree of decentralization. As predicted by our model,
when the local government is the principal, an increase in the bias leads to the decentralization
scheme only when the quality of information transmission is relatively high. This positive interac-
tion effect is significant at the five- or one-percent level for all five characteristics. When the federal
government is the principal, the interaction effect is negative but insignificant. The differences be-
tween these coefficients are significant at least at the ten-percent level for all five constitutional and
statutory country characteristics. In summary, the empirical results are in line with our theoretical
predictions.
Important policy implications arise from these findings, especially for supranational institutions
like the EuropeanUnion, inwhich centralized fiscal spending is rare even among groups of nations
that coordinate on many policy areas, such as the Eurozone (e.g., Simon and Valasek 2013). In this
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case, for example, centralization may be too low as a consequence of the bias in objectives between
the member states and the institutions of the European Union. More specifically, the allocation
of control rights over policies may sub-optimally remain with the local governments (the member
states) in certain areas, under-exploiting the knowledge of the EU Institutions in the presence of a
bias.
The analysis is of course limited in several respects. We do not claim to draw causal inferences
from the empirical analysis, given the nature of the data available, but stress that the correlations
resulting from our empirical analysis are in line with the predictions from the theory. Other types
of decentralization besides the fiscal realm have been neglected. It will be an important endeavor
to test our theory again when data that allow a distinction about the actual control rights of lo-
cal units over policy for a larger sample of countries become available. What is more, it might be
promising to explore the differences between developing and developed countries as well as the
interaction between different local units, which in turn may have different degrees of bias, and
different access to information. There remains much scope for the analysis of information trans-
mission in richer models of fiscal federalism. We hope to have shown that the task is worthwhile
and that the conclusions can be instructive.
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Tables 
Table 1: Sources and Definitions 
  Variable Definition Source 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Expenditure 
Decentralization     
Subnational expenditures (local  
and state level) / expenditure by 
general government (all levels) 
IMF (2012) 
CONTROL VARIABLES     
  (log) GDP       Log of GDP p.c.,  
purchasing power adjusted 
Heston et al. (2012) 
  (log) Land Area     Log of land area (square km) Treisman (2006) 
  (log) Population   Log of population World Bank (2013) 
Urbanization Urban population as % of total World Bank (2013) 
  Democracy 
Dummy 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if 
country is classified as democracy 
Cheibub et al. (2010) 
VARIABLES OF INTEREST     
Bias    
 Heterogeneity Ethnic fractionalization  Alesina et al. (2003) 
  Ethnic Tensions Perception of the risk of ethnic 
tensions 
ICRG (2013) 
  Government 
Stability 
Perception that the government is 
stable 
ICRG (2013) 
  Government 
Fractionalization 
Chance that two random draws  
will produce legislators from two 
different parties 
Beck et al. (2001) 
  Migrant Share Migrants as % of total population World Bank (2013) 
Externalities    
 Trade Openness Exports plus imports as % of GDP Heston et al. (2012) 
  Oil Rents     Oil rents (crude oil production  
value at world prices minus total 
production costs) as % of GDP 
World Bank (2013) 
  Risk of External 
Conflicts 
Perception of the risk of external 
conflict 
ICRG (2013) 
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Table 1 continued 
Knowledge 
 
      
  Information 
Transmission 
Fixed telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants 
International 
Telecommunication 
Union (2011) 
 Information 
Transparency 
Index 
Composite global index of 
information transparency 
Williams (2014) 
  Missing data 
(World Bank) 
Share in all data series for which 
data are reported 
World Bank (2013) 
  Corruption   Perceived corruption ICRG (2013) 
  Press Freedom Annual survey of media 
independence  
Freedom House (2011) 
Importance of local knowledge  
  
  
  Heterogeneity Ethnic fractionalization  Alesina et al. (2003) 
  Ethnic Tensions Perception of the risk of ethnic 
tensions 
ICRG (2013) 
  Migrant Share Migrants as % of total population World Bank (2013) 
Importance of federal knowledge 
 
  
  Educational 
Quality 
Tertiary school enrollment as % of the 
age group that officially corresponds 
to this level of education 
World Bank (2013) 
  Trade Openness Exports plus imports as % of GDP Heston et al. (2012) 
  Oil Rents     Oil rents (crude oil production value 
at world prices minus total 
production costs) as % of GDP 
World Bank (2013) 
  Risk of External 
Conflicts 
Perception of the risk of external 
conflict 
ICRG (2013) 
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Table 2: Decentralization, Bias and Knowledge, 1972 – 2010, OLS  
Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expenditure Decentralization        Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. 
(log) GDP       6.53*** [2.33]     -0.58 [2.89] -2.40 [4.16] -3.33 [2.61] 
(log) Land Area     3.37*** [1.11]     2.21* [1.23] 0.51 [1.45] 2.33** [1.10] 
(log) Population   0.45 [1.41]     0.16 [1.45] 1.51 [1.42] 0.09 [1.19] 
Urbanization 0.13 [0.13]     -0.002 [0.11] 0.14 [0.12] 0.01 [0.09] 
Democracy Dummy 2.07 [2.52]     -3.50 [2.57] -8.88 [5.80] -5.85** [2.38] 
Heterogeneity     0.24*** [0.08] 0.21** [0.09] 0.25** [0.10] -0.11 [0.09] 
Trade Openness     -0.10*** [0.03] -0.03 [0.04] -0.10* [0.05] -0.04 [0.03] 
Oil Rents         0.03 [0.13] -0.15 [0.12] -0.18 [0.17] -0.01 [0.12] 
Information Transmission     0.40*** [0.13] 0.48** [0.20] 0.30 [0.21] 0.31 [0.19] 
Missing data (World Bank)     -0.02 [0.13] -0.05 [0.11] -0.02 [0.22] -0.12 [0.12] 
Educational Quality     0.29*** [0.08] 0.25*** [0.09] 0.27*** [0.09] 0.32*** [0.08] 
Ethnic Tensions             -1.41 [1.47]     
Government Stability             -0.49 [0.67]     
Government Fractionalization             0.09 [0.06]     
Migrant Share             0.37** [0.17]     
Risk of External Conflicts             -2.40*** [0.69]     
Corruption               2.21 [1.67]     
Press Freedom             0.004 [0.10]     
Heterogeneity*Information Transmission               0.01*** [0.00] 
Period Dummies  Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      
Region Dummies   Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes      
Adj. R-Squared 0.43   0.53   0.56   0.63   0.60   
Number of Observations 388   338   338   225   338   
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the country level) in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Decentralization, Bias and Knowledge, 1972 – 2010, OLS  
Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expenditure Decentralization        Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. 
(log) GDP       6.51*** [2.33]   5.59* [3.24] 1.34 [3.00] 5.01 [3.10] 
(log) Land Area     3.37*** [1.11]   2.38 [1.63] 0.54 [1.92] 2.42 [1.61] 
(log) Population   0.45 [1.41]   -0.62 [1.53] 1.65 [1.62] -0.25 [1.47] 
Urbanization 0.13 [0.13]   0.11 [0.13] 0.25* [0.13] 0.09 [0.13] 
Democracy Dummy 2.10 [2.52]   -2.33 [2.44] -7.22 [4.89] -3.52 [2.75] 
Heterogeneity   0.27*** [0.08] 0.22* [0.13] 0.22* [0.12] -0.51 [0.32] 
Trade Openness   -0.10*** [0.03] -0.05 [0.05] -0.11 [0.07] -0.05 [0.05] 
Oil Rents       0.19 [0.17] -0.12 [0.15] -0.03 [0.24] -0.04 [0.15] 
Information Transparency   -0.06 [0.24] 0.09 [0.27] -0.20 [0.36] -0.26 [0.32] 
Missing data (World Bank)   -0.08 [0.14] -0.06 [0.16] 0.13 [0.23] -0.18 [0.16] 
Educational Quality   0.31*** [0.09] 0.23* [0.13] 0.26** [0.12] 0.25* [0.13] 
Ethnic Tensions       -2.10 [1.33]   
Government Stability       -0.08 [0.71]   
Government Fractionalization       0.12 [0.09]   
Migrant Share       0.48** [0.21]   
Risk of External Conflicts       -2.38*** [0.75]   
Corruption         2.65 [1.60]   
Press Freedom       0.10 [0.11]   
Heterogeneity* Information Transparency               0.01*** [0.00] 
Period Dummies  Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      
Region Dummies   Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes      
Adj. R-Squared 0.43  0.54  0.51  0.62  0.53   
Number of Observations 387  321  321  222  321   
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the country level) in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: Decentralization, Bias and Knowledge, 1972 – 2010, Random Effects 
Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expenditure Decentralization Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
(log) GDP       4.45** [1.79]   2.81 [1.89] 2.23 [2.60] 0.99 [2.13] 
(log) Land Area     3.35*** [0.97]   3.69*** [1.11] 3.67*** [1.26] 4.32*** [1.15] 
(log) Population   0.69 [1.29]   0.04 [1.29] 1.00 [1.69] 0.00 [1.25] 
Urbanization 0.15 [0.10]   0.15* [0.08] 0.20* [0.11] 0.09 [0.10] 
Democracy Dummy 2.64 [2.10]   1.58 [2.51] -4.16 [4.87] 1.17 [2.10] 
Heterogeneity   0.12* [0.07] 0.12 [0.07] 0.18** [0.09] -0.20 [0.13] 
Trade Openness   -0.05** [0.02] -0.02 [0.03] -0.02 [0.04] -0.02 [0.02] 
Oil Rents       -0.20** [0.09] -0.32*** [0.09] -0.39*** [0.12] -0.27** [0.12] 
Information Transmission   0.21*** [0.08] 0.13 [0.09] 0.13 [0.11] -0.13 [0.11] 
Missing data (World Bank)   0.01 [0.11] 0.02 [0.11] -0.17 [0.25] -0.09 [0.12] 
Educational Quality   0.10* [0.06] 0.06 [0.06] 0.03 [0.06] 0.12** [0.06] 
Ethnic Tensions       -0.87 [0.80]   
Government Stability       0.14 [0.45]   
Government Fractionalization       0.05 [0.07]   
Migrant Share       -0.03 [0.38]   
Risk of External Conflicts       -0.38 [0.63]   
Corruption         0.80 [0.91]   
Press Freedom       0.09 [0.10]   
Heterogeneity*Information Transmission               0.01*** [0.00] 
Period Dummies  Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      
Region Dummies   Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes      
Adj. R-Squared 0.43  0.53  0.56  0.63  0.60   
Number of Observations 387  338  338  225  338   
Notes: Re-estimation of table two using the random-effects estimator. Standard errors (clustered at the country level) in brackets.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Interaction between Heterogeneity and Information, 1972 – 2010, OLS 
Agenda setting government level: Local Federal Local Federal  
 Information Transmission Information Transparency 
  Coef. 
 
Coef. 
 
P-value Coef.  Coef.  P-value 
  
Federation type: Unitary or federal (Norris 2008) 
 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.013** [0.005] 0.000 [0.003] 0.026 0.018* [0.009] 0.005 [0.004] 0.140 
Adj. R-Squared 0.83  0.89   0.71   0.53   
Number of observations 126  212   119   202   
  Classified as "federal" (Elazar 1995) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.009** [0.004] -0.002 [0.005] 0.061 0.024*** [0.007] 0.009* [0.005] 0.051 
Adj. R-Squared 0.87  0.81   0.64   0.58   
Number of observations 191  147   176   145   
  Residual powers to legislate (Treisman 2008) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.009** [0.003] -0.001 [0.006] 0.094 0.020*** [0.006] 0.007 [0.005] 0.062 
Adj. R-Squared 0.72  0.85   0.59   0.61   
Number of observations 207  131   192   129   
  Sub-national government authority (Keefer 2013) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.010*** [0.003] -0.019 [0.013] 0.000 0.012** [0.006] -0.015** [0.006] 0.000 
Adj. R-Squared 0.82  0.9   0.52   0.95   
Number of observations 299  39   285   36   
  Legislature or executive locally elected (Treisman 2008) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.011*** [0.004] -0.003 [0.005] 0.007 0.020*** [0.007] -0.004 [0.005] 0.001 
Adj. R-Squared 0.81  0.92   0.47   0.83   
Number of observations 265  71   249   70   
Notes: Interaction effect between heterogeneity and an information proxy (specified in second row) for local and federal government as 
agenda setters. Standard errors (clustered at the country level) in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. P-value corresponds to a test 
for significant differences between the coefficients for federal and unitary states. 
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Table 6: Interaction between Heterogeneity and Information, 1972 – 2010, OLS (with initial decentralization) 
Agenda setting government level: Local Federal Local Federal  
 Information Transmission Information Transparency 
  Coef. 
 
Coef. 
 
P-value Coef.  Coef.  P-value 
  Federation type: Unitary or federal (Norris 2008) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.013** [0.005] -0.003 [0.002] 0.000 0.026*** [0.008] 0.001 [0.002] 0.001 
Adj. R-Squared 0.83  0.89   0.71   0.89   
Number of observations 126  212   119   202   
  Classified as "federal" (Elazar 1995) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.008*** [0.003] -0.002 [0.003] 0.000 0.021*** [0.006] 0.003 [0.004] 0.006 
Adj. R-Squared 0.87  0.81   0.89   0.8   
Number of observations 191  147   176   145   
  Residual powers to legislate (Treisman 2008) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.009*** [0.002] -0.001 [0.003] 0.000 0.021*** [0.006] 0.001 [0.003] 0.001 
Adj. R-Squared 0.72  0.85   0.86   0.83   
Number of observations 207  131   192   129   
  Sub-national government authority (Keefer 2013) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.007*** [0.002] -0.018 [0.018] 0.000 0.013*** [0.005] -0.014** [0.005] 0.000 
Adj. R-Squared 0.82  0.9   0.83   0.95   
Number of observations 299  39   285   36   
  Legislature or executive locally elected (Treisman 2008) 
Heterogeneity*Information  0.009*** [0.002] -0.003 [0.003] 0.000 0.016** [0.006] -0.002 [0.006] 0.012 
Adj. R-Squared 0.81  0.92   0.81   0.92   
Number of observations 265  71   249   70   
Notes: Interaction effect between Heterogeneity and an information proxy (specified in second row) for local and federal government as 
agenda setters. Standard errors (clustered at the country level) in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. P-value corresponds to a test 
for significant differences between the coefficients for federal and unitary states. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Choice between centralization and decentralization as a function of L and F when the 
federal government is the agenda setter 
 
Figure 2: Choice between centralization and decentralization as a function of L and F when the 
local government is the agenda setter 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of Heterogeneity on the share of subnational government expenditure 
for different levels of Information Transmission (Table 2, column 5). The dashed line shows the 
90%-confidence interval. 
 
 
Figure 4: Marginal effect of Heterogeneity on the share of subnational government expenditure 
for different levels of Information Transmission (Table 4, row 2). For countries classified as 
"local" by Elazar (1995), i.e., with the local government as agenda setter. The dashed line shows 
the 90%-confidence interval. 
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Figure 5: Marginal effect of Heterogeneity on the share of subnational government expenditure 
for different levels of Information Transmission (Table 4, row 2). For countries classified as 
"federal" by Elazar (1995), i.e., with the federal government as agenda setter. The dashed line 
shows the 90%-confidence interval. 
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Appendices
Appendix A: Definition and properties of the communication game
This Appendix provides the definition of the communication game and the properties of the equi-
librium outlined in Section 3.
Let t ∈ [0, F ] denote the message that the federal government sends to the local, when asked to
offer its advice. Let q (t| f) denote the density function that the federal government sends message
twhen it has observed f. q (t| f) is the reporting rule chosen by the federal government. Let p(l, t)
be the policy chosen by the local government, given the federal government has sent message t to
the local government. We then have that: de
Definition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the communication game consists of a reporting rule
q (t| f) and an action rule for the local government p(l, t) such that:
i) for each f ∈ [0, F ] , ´R q (t| f) dt = 1. If t∗ is in the support of q (t| f), t∗ is such that:
t∗ = argminLFed =
ˆ L
0
[p(l, t)− p∗F ]2fL(l)dl, (A.1)
and
ii) for each t, p(l, t) solves
p(l, t) = argminLLoc =
ˆ F
0
[p(l, t)− p∗L]2 g (f | t)df, (A.2)
where g (f | t) = q(t|f)fF (f)´ F
0 q(t|θ)fF (θ)dθ
.
According to condition (i), the reporting rule q (t| f) chosen by the federal government minimizes
the federal government’s expected loss, given the local government’s action rule p(l, t). In other
words, the equilibrium reporting rule q (t| f) induces the local government to choose policies p(l, t),
which minimize the expected loss of the federal government. Condition (ii) simply says that the
local government responds optimally to each federal government report t. Namely, the local gov-
ernment uses Bayes’ rule to update its prior on f, given the federal government’s reporting strat-
egy and the signal received. Then, given the federal government’s report t and the posterior den-
sity function of f given t—that is, g (f | t)—p(l, t)minimizes the local government’s expected loss.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that this communication game does not have a full revelation
equilibrium, but that there are multiple equilibria which are all partition equilibria. More specif-
ically, the state space [0, F ] is partitioned into intervals and the federal government only reveals
which interval the true value of f belongs to. The following characterizes the relevant equilibria
of the communication game.
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Proposition 1 There exists at least one equilibrium with the following properties: there is a positive integer
N , such that one can define a set of N +1 real numbers, with generic element denoted by fi, such that
0 = f0 < f1 < ... < fN−1 < fN = 1, and
(a) q (t| f) is uniform, supported on [fi, fi+1] , if t ∈ (fi, fi+1);
(b) p(l, t) = l + fi+fi+12 − bL, for all t ∈ (fi, fi+1).
Moreover:
(i)
´ L
0
[
l + (fi+fi+12 )− (l + fi)−B
]2
f(l)dl =
´ L
0
[
(l + fi)−
[
l + (fi−1+fi2 )
]
+B
]2
f(l)dl;
(ii) f0 = 0; fN = F .
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorem 1 in Crawford and Sobel (1982). 
Condition (i) is an ‘arbitrage’ condition which says that for states of nature that fall on the bound-
aries of two intervals the federal government must be indifferent between the actions (p(l, t)) on
these two intervals. Condition (i) defines a second order linear differential equation on fi, while
condition (ii) specifies its initial and terminal conditions. Since the federal government is not in-
formed on the true value of l, when choosing t, it will take the expected value of l, that is L/2. The
arbitrage condition (i) then reduces to, for i = 1, ..., N − 1,
L
2
+
(
fi+1 + fi
2
)
−
(
L
2
+ fi
)
−B = L
2
+ fi −
[
L
2
+
(
fi−1 + fi
2
)]
+B, (A.3)
from which it implies
fi+1 = 2fi − fi−1 + 4B. (A.4)
This second order linear difference equation has a class of solutions parameterized by f1 (given
that f0 = 0)
fi = if1 + 2i(i− 1)B, i = 1, ..., N − 1. (A.5)
Given that fN = F it is the case that
f1 =
F − 2N(N − 1)B
N
, (A.6)
which, using (A.4) and substituting for the value of f1, becomes
fi =
iF
N
− 2i(N − i)B, i = 1, ..., N. (A.7)
From (A.7) it follows that
fi − fi−1 = F
N
+ 2(2i−N − 1)B, (A.8)
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where the width of the interval increases by 4B for each increase in i.
Notice that the centralization game is entirely symmetric to the decentralization game. As before,
the government’s report r is determined by a partition {li} of [0, L] .Again, it is possible to define a
reporting rule q (r| l) and a posterior belief
g (l| r) = q (r| l)fl(l)´ L
0 q (r| η)fL(η)d(η)
, (A.9)
such that, given the report r ∈ [li, li+1], the federal’s expected value of l is (li + li+1) /2 (poste-
rior mean of the random variable l˜, given r). Thus, the federal government will implement the
following policy:
p(l, r) =
li + li+1
2
+ f + bF if r ∈ [li, li+1] , i = 1, ..., N − 1. (A.10)
The partition {li} of [0, L] is computed using the conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1, in a similar
way as above, that is:
lN−i − lN−(i−1) =
L
N
− 2(2i−N − 1)B, (A.11)
where the width of the interval decreases by 4B for each increase in i.

Appendix B: Derivation of equations (7), (9), (10) and (12)
Under decentralization, following Proposition 1 and using (A.8), the federal government’s ex ante
expected loss for the equilibrium of size N is given by
LFedDec(N,B, F ) =
ˆ F
0
(p(l, t)− p∗F )2 g (f | t)df,
=
ˆ F
0
(
l +
fi + fi+1
2
− bL − l − f − bF
)2
g (f | t)df,
=
1
F
N∑
i=1
ˆ fi
fi−1
(
fi−1 + fi
2
− f −B
)2
df,
=
1
F
1
12
N∑
i=1
(fi − fi−1)3 + 1
F
B2 (f0 − fN ) ,
=
1
12
N∑
i=1
[
F
N
+ 2(2i−N − 1)B
]3
+
1
F
B2 (f0 − fN ) ,
= σ2f +B
2 (f0 = 0; fN = F , see Proposition 1), (B.1)
with the last equality following from equation (8). Here, D stands for decentralization and σ2f is
the ex-ante residual variance of f , that is the uncertainty about f faced by the local government
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before being reported by the federal government the equilibrium signal t
On the other hand, the local government’s ex ante expected loss is given by
LLocDec(N,B, F ) =
ˆ F
0
(p(l, t)− p∗L)2 g (f | t)df,
=
ˆ F
0
(
l +
fi + fi+1
2
− bL − l − f + bL
)2
g (f | t)df,
=
1
F
N∑
i=1
ˆ fi
fi−1
(
fi−1 + fi
2
− f
)2
df,
=
1
12
N∑
i=1
(fi − fi−1)3 ,
=
1
12
N∑
i=1
[
F
N
+ 2(2i−N − 1)B
]3
,
= σ2f , (B.2)
with the last equality following again from equation (8). Since both players’ ex ante expected loss
is decreasing with N , Crawford and Sobel assume that both agents coordinate on the most infor-
mative equilibrium N(F,B),which is thus a focal equilibrium.
Under centralization, following Proposition 1 and using (A.11), the federal government’s ex ante
expected loss for the equilibrium of size N is given by:
LFedCen(N,B, F ) =
ˆ L
0
[p(f, r)− p∗F ]2 g (l| r)dl,
=
1
L
N∑
i=1
ˆ li
li−1
(
li + li+1
2
+ f + bF − f − l − bF
)2
df,
=
1
L
N∑
i=1
ˆ li
li−1
(
li−1 + li
2
− l
)2
df,
=
1
L
1
12
N∑
i=1
(li − li−1)3
=
1
L
1
12
N∑
i=1
[
L
N
+ 2(2i−N − 1)B
]3
,
= σ2l , (B.3)
where the last equality follows from equation (11).
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On the other hand, the local government’s ex ante expected loss is given by
LLocCen(N,B, F ) =
ˆ L
0
[p(f, r)− p∗L]2 g (l| r)dl,
=
1
L
N∑
i=1
ˆ li
li−1
(
li + li+1
2
+ f + bF − f − l + bL
)2
df,
=
1
L
N∑
i=1
ˆ li
li−1
(
li−1 + li
2
− l +B
)2
df,
=
1
L
1
12
N∑
i=1
(li − li−1)3 + B
2
L
N∑
i=1
(li − li−1)
=
1
L
1
12
N∑
i=1
[
L
N
+ 2(2i−N − 1)B
]3
− B
2
L
(l0 − lN )
= σ2l +B
2 (l0 = 0; lN = L, see Proposition 1) . (B.4)

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Appendix C: Proof of statements in Section 5 and 7
The statement given in Section 5 follows directly fromProposition 2 below. By comparing its ex ante
expected loss under decentralization (LFedDec(N,B, F )) with the one it incurs under centralization
(LFedCen(N,B, F )), the federal government determines whether or not to retain its control rights over
policies.
Proposition 2 The federal government prefers decentralization if and only if L ≥ F (L,B), where F (L,B)
is continuous and increasing in L and, for any B, F (L,B) < L.
Proof: The proof follows Theorem 1 in Harris and Raviv (2005). 
The statement given in Section 7 follows directly fromProposition 3 below. By comparing its ex ante
expected loss under decentralization (LLocDec(N,B, F )) with the one it incurs under centralization
(LLocCen(N,B, F )), the local government determines whether or not to retain its control rights over
policies.
Proposition 3 The local government prefers centralization if and only if F ≥ L(F,B), where L(F,B) is
continuous and increasing in F and, for any B, L(F,B) > F .
Proof: The proof follows Theorem 1 in Harris and Raviv (2005). 
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Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics 
                     Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Exp. Decentralization     338 27.5 15.15 0.61 63.77 
(log) GDP       338 9.66 0.82 6.51 11.24 
(log) Land Area     338 11.82 1.93 5.77 16.61 
(log) Population   338 15.97 1.46 12.30 19.42 
Urbanization 338 70.19 14.62 20.02 97.38 
Democracy Dummy 338 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Heterogeneity 338 28.8 21.82 0.20 87.47 
Trade Openness 338 80.5 46.51 14.92 314.71 
Oil Rents     338 1.81 6.84 0.00 63.98 
Information Transmission 338 35.53 17.27 0.15 72.91 
Information Transparency 
Index 310 68.55 9.19 28 85 
Missing data (World Bank) 338 54.09 14.02 20.21 84.44 
Educational Quality 338 39.81 20.18 1.14 97.69 
Ethnic Tensions 279 1.38 1.14 0.00 4.92 
Government Stability 279 8.2 1.58 3.94 11.42 
Gov. Fractionalization 279 66.21 18.79 0.00 89.71 
Migrant Share 314 8.63 8.03 0.13 48.00 
Risk of External Conflicts 279 1.19 1.37 0.00 9.00 
Corruption   298 3.97 1.44 1.00 6.00 
Press Freedom 324 70.98 18.03 10.67 95.00 
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Appendix E: Correlations 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Exp. Decentralization     (1) 1                    
(log) GDP       (2) 0.45 1                   
(log) Land Area     (3) 0.35 -0.17 1                  
(log) Population   (4) 0.29 -0.09 0.81 1                 
Urbanization (5) 0.33 0.76 -0.03 0.02 1                
Democracy Dummy (6) 0.18 0.53 -0.13 -0.04 0.35 1               
Heterogeneity (7) -0.08 -0.45 0.12 0.00 -0.33 -0.3 1              
Trade Openness (8) -0.30 0.14 -0.61 -0.52 0.12 -0.05 0.06 1             
Oil Rents     (9) -0.10 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.29 0.22 0.05 1            
Inf. Transmission (10) 0.50 0.82 -0.10 -0.02 0.63 0.54 -0.44 0.12 -0.15 1           
Information Transparency 
Index 
(11) 0.37 0.72 0.06 0.13 0.61 0.62 -0.34 0.07 -0.13 0.73 1          
Missing data (World Bank) (12) -0.16 -0.13 0.20 0.22 0.01 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.40 1         
Educational Quality (13) 0.42 0.65 0.13 0.14 0.58 0.47 -0.33 0.05 -0.15 0.72 0.70 0.16 1        
Ethnic Tensions (14) -0.04 -0.39 0.10 0.16 -0.40 -0.17 0.51 -0.08 0.07 -0.37 -0.35 0.07 -0.28 1       
Government Stability (15) 0.03 0.25 -0.10 -0.07 0.18 0.01 -0.10 0.28 0.12 0.30 0.37 0.21 0.24 -0.28 1      
Gov. Fractionalization (16) 0.29 0.39 -0.11 -0.12 0.35 0.48 -0.11 0.08 -0.08 0.38 0.43 0.08 0.42 -0.16 0.23 1     
Migrant Share (17) 0.13 0.40 -0.32 -0.25 0.48 0.03 0.10 0.35 0.30 0.31 0.18 -0.18 0.19 -0.02 0.18 0.22 1    
Risk of Ext. Conflicts (18) -0.18 -0.41 0.09 0.11 -0.27 -0.35 0.25 -0.16 0.15 -0.35 -0.50 0.01 -0.26 0.40 -0.24 -0.26 0.05 1   
Corruption   (19) 0.40 0.59 -0.09 -0.15 0.45 0.32 -0.34 -0.03 -0.20 0.61 0.33 -0.58 0.28 -0.27 -0.01 0.22 0.19 -0.26 1  
Press Freedom (20) 0.33 0.63 -0.09 -0.09 0.43 0.71 -0.34 -0.05 -0.29 0.63 0.65 -0.09 0.49 -0.27 0.03 0.42 0.05 -0.42 0.53 1 
Notes: Simple correlations between all variables included in the empirical section 
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Appendix F: Classification of countries 
Federation type: 
Unitary or federal 
(Norris 2008) 
Classified as "federal" 
(Elazar 1995) 
Residual powers to 
legislate 
(Treisman 2008) 
Sub-national government 
authority over taxing, 
spending, or legislating 
(Keefer 2013) 
Legislature or 
executive locally 
elected  
(Treisman 2008) 
Country  0 1  Country  0 1  Country 0 1  Country 0 1  Country 0 1 
Afghanistan X       Albania X       Albania X       Argentina   X Afghanistan X       
Albania X       Argentina   X Argentina   X Armenia X       Albania   X 
Argentina   X Armenia X       Armenia X       Australia   X Argentina X X 
Armenia X       Azerbaijan X       Azerbaijan   X Austria   X Armenia X X 
Australia   X Belarus X       Belarus X       Bahrain X       Australia   X 
Austria   X Bolivia X       Bolivia X       Belarus X       Austria   X 
Azerbaijan X       Botswana X       Brazil   X Belgium X X Azerbaijan X X 
Bahrain X       Brazil   X Bulgaria X       Bhutan X       Bahrain X       
Barbados X       Bulgaria X       Canada   X Botswana   X Barbados X       
Belarus X       Canada   X Chile X       Brazil   X Belarus X X 
Belgium   X Chile X       China X       Bulgaria X       Belgium   X 
Bhutan   X China X       Colombia X       Canada   X Bhutan X       
Bolivia X       Colombia X       Costa Rica X       Chile X       Bolivia X       
Botswana X       Costa Rica X       Croatia X       Colombia   X Botswana   X 
Brazil   X Croatia X       Czech Republic X       Congo, Rep. X       Brazil   X 
Bulgaria X       Czech 
Republic 
X       Egypt X       Costa Rica X       Bulgaria   X 
Canada   X Egypt X       Estonia X       Cote d'Ivoire X       Canada   X 
Cape Verde X       Estonia X       Ethiopia   X Croatia X       Cape Verde   X 
Chile X       Ethiopia   X France X       Czech Republic   X Chile X       
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Appendix F: Classification of countries (continued)         
China   X France X       Georgia X       Dominican 
Republic 
X       China   X 
Colombia   X Georgia X       Germany   X Egypt X X Colombia   X 
Congo, Rep. X       Germany   X Hungary X       Estonia X       Congo, Rep.   X 
Costa Rica X       Guatemala X       India   X Ethiopia X   Costa Rica X       
Cote d'Ivoire X       Hungary X       Indonesia X       Fiji   X Cote d'Ivoire   X 
Croatia X       India   X Italy   X Finland   X Croatia   X 
Czech Republic X       Indonesia X       Kazakhstan X       France X X Czech Republic   X 
Denmark X       Italy X       Kenya X       Georgia X       Denmark   X 
Dominican 
Republic 
X       Kazakhstan X       Kyrgyz 
Republic 
X       Germany   X Dominican 
Republic 
X       
Egypt X       Kenya X       Lithuania X       Guatemala X       Egypt   X 
Estonia X       Kyrgyz 
Republic 
X       Malaysia   X Hungary X       Ethiopia   X 
Ethiopia   X Lithuania X       Mexico   X India   X Fiji   X 
Fiji   X Malaysia   X Moldova X       Italy   X Finland X X 
Finland X       Mexico   X Peru X       Kuwait X       France   X 
France X       Moldova X       Philippines X       Malaysia   X Germany   X 
Georgia   X Nicaragua X       Poland X       Mexico   X Guatemala X       
Germany   X Panama X       Portugal X       Philippines   X Hungary X       
Guatemala X       Peru X       Romania X       Senegal   X Iceland   X 
Hungary X       Philippines X       Russia   X Singapore X       India   X 
Iceland X       Poland X       Senegal X       Spain   X Indonesia X X 
India   X Portugal X       Singapore X       Sweden   X Iran X X 
Indonesia   X Romania X       Slovak 
Republic 
X       Switzerland   X Ireland   X 
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Appendix F: Classification of countries (continued)         
Iran X       Russia   X Slovenia X       Trinidad and 
Tobago 
  X Israel   X 
Ireland X       Senegal X       South Africa   X United States   X Italy   X 
Israel X    Singapore X    Spain   X       Japan   X 
Italy   X Slovak 
Republic 
X       Sweden X             Jordan X       
Jamaica X       Slovenia X       Thailand X             Kazakhstan   X 
Japan   X South Africa X       Trinidad and 
Tobago 
X             Korea, Rep. X X 
Jordan X       Spain   X Tunisia X             Kuwait X       
Kazakhstan X       Sweden X       Uganda X             Kyrgyz Republic   X 
Kenya X       Thailand X       United 
Kingdom 
X             Lesotho X       
Korea, Rep. X       Trinidad and 
Tobago 
X       United States   X       Lithuania X       
Kuwait X       Tunisia X       Zambia X             Luxembourg X       
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
X       Uganda X       Zimbabwe X             Macedonia X       
Latvia X       Ukraine X                   Malaysia   X 
Lesotho X       United 
Kingdom 
X                   Maldives X       
Lithuania X       United States   X             Malta X       
Luxembourg X       Uruguay X                   Mauritius   X 
Macedonia X       Zambia X                   Mexico   X 
Malaysia   X Zimbabwe X                   Mongolia   X 
Maldives X                         Netherlands   X 
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Appendix F: Classification of countries (continued) 
 
        
Malta X                         New Zealand   X 
Mauritius X                         Nicaragua X       
Mexico   X                   Norway   X 
Moldova X                         Panama X X 
Mongolia X                      Paraguay X    
Netherlands   X                   Peru X       
New Zealand X                         Philippines   X 
Nicaragua X                         Poland   X 
Norway X                         Portugal X X 
Panama X                         Romania   X 
Paraguay X                         Senegal   X 
Peru X                         Singapore X       
Philippines X                         Slovak Republic X X 
Poland X                         South Africa   X 
Portugal   X                   Spain   X 
Romania X                         Sri Lanka X X 
Russia   X                   Swaziland X       
Senegal X                         Sweden   X 
Singapore X                         Switzerland   X 
Slovak Republic X                         Syria X X 
Slovenia X                         Tajikistan   X 
South Africa   X                   Thailand X       
Spain   X                   Togo   X 
Sri Lanka X                         Trinidad & 
Tobago 
  X 
Swaziland X                         Tunisia   X 
